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Ivo

VAN BAEL*

A Practitioner's Guide to
Due Process in EEC Antitrust and
Antidumping Proceedings
For years the defense bar in Europe-and, needless to say, their clientshas been lamenting the lack of due process in EEC antitrust and antidumping proceedings. Most complaints stemmed from the combined role of
prosecutor and judge played by the EEC Commission in these administrative proceedings. Much to the surprise of many a Cassandra, the Commission reacted positively to this wave of criticism. The Commission is currently
implementing a series of procedural improvements which tend to be more
generous than the rulings of the Court of Justice, the European Communities' Supreme Court, which has traditionally followed a rather restrictive
view of the rights of defense.
This article will describe this welcome development in order to see
whether the new measures effectively improve the situation, or whether
further efforts are required.
I. Antitrust
The application of the competition rules of the EEC, embodied in Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, is in the first instance the task of the
Commission. However, since the Commission's actions and policy are subject to scrutiny by the Court of Justice, the latter's attitude toward due
process and its practical implications need likewise to be examined.
A.

THE COMMISSION

UNICE, i.e., the European Manufacturers' Association, the International Bar Association and other legal and business circles have over the
*Partner of the law firm of DeBandt, Van Hecke, Lagae & Van Bael in Brussels, Belgium
and member of the Brussels Bar.
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years voiced strong criticism about the way in which the EEC Commission
handled competition cases. Initially, these bitter complaints were shrugged
off by the responsible Commission Member as being "excessively harsh and
biased." 1 Gradually, however, as pressures, notably from the European
Parliament and U.K. House of Lords, continued to rise, the Commission
became willing to discuss some of the flaws in the system. As a result of this
soul-searching, the Commission has published in its Eleventh, Twelfth and
Thirteenth Reports on Competition Policy a number of suggested improvements which are being implemented. They are essentially designed to alleviate shortcomings in the discovery procedure and in the organization of the
hearing. In addition the Commission is pursuing a policy of speeding up its
various procedures.
1. The Discovery Procedure
The Commission's powers of discovery essentially consist of the right to
send a request for information and to carry out on-the-spot investigations.
Defendants are granted access to the Commission's files.
a. Request for Information
In instances of suspected infringement of Article 85 or 86, the Commission may seek to obtain all "necessary" information from the companies
involved, from third parties and from the national authorities of the Member States.2 A two-step procedure is involved: a formal Commission decision compelling the addressee to supply certain information must be preceded by a simple request for information which he may, but need not,
answer.
The Commission's power to send out questionnaires, of course, has never
been disputed. As a result, case law on the subject tends to deal only with
fine points rather than with the broad principle. Some of these issues are
nevertheless worth mentioning. For example, the Commission has ruled
that questions raised in a request for information must be answered in good
faith and in their proper context. In other words, a legalistic approach will
not do and fines will apply if significant facts are being concealed. 3 Furthermore, in the Telos case the Commission defined "incorrect" information as being:
any statement ... which gives a distorted picture of the true facts asked for, and
which departs significantly from reality on major points. Where a statement is thus
1. Reply to Written Question 840/80, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 283) 41 (1980)
2. Art. 11 of Reg. 17, O.J. EUR. COMM. spec. ed. 1959-62, p. 57.
3. National Panasonic (Belgium), Comm'n Dec. of 11 Dec.1981, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
113) 18 (1982) National Panasonic (France), Comm'n Dec. of 11 Dec. 1981, as amended by
Comm'n Dec. of 21 June 1982, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 211) 32 (1982); Comptoir Commercial
d'Importation, Comm'n Dec. of 17 November 1981 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 27) 31 (1982)
Telos Comm'n Dec. of 25 Nov. 1981, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 58) 19 (1982).
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false or so incomplete that the reply taken in its entirety is likely to mislead the
Commission about the true facts,
it constitutes incorrect information within the
4
meaning of Article 15 (1)(b)

Therefore, if the question is ambiguous, as sometimes happens, the answer
had better be drafted in clear terms to avoid any misunderstanding later.
As discussed later, the Commission is actively encouraging private enforcement. In this connection, a complainant in a Commission proceeding,
or an intervener in a Court proceeding, has access to the nonconfidential
part of the Commission's file. Hence, the reply given to a questionnaire may
be subject to discovery. Thus, a complainant or intervener can obtain
documents which could later be used as evidence in a damage suit before a
national court. When preparing the answer to a questionnaire it is therefore
essential to clearly mark as "confidential" whatever information is supplied
which constitutes a business secret.
The question of whether the Commission's power to request information
extends to companies located outside the EEC has not yet been ruled upon.
However, in the CommercialSolvents case, the Commission apparently sent
an informal request for information to CSC in New York which remained
unanswered. 5 Needless to say, if the information requested from a company
inside the EEC is embodied in documents located outside the EEC-even
though such documents ought normally to be kept at the company's offices
in the EEC-the Commission is likely to order the production of such
documents by imposing a daily penalty for non-compliance on the company
located in the EEC. In this connection the following paragraphs from the
Commission's CSV decision are of interest:
The reason given by CSV for refusing to comply with the request is unacceptable.
The information requested concerns the business activity of the Dutch firms
belonging to CSV and of CSV itself. The information is available within the
Community and the Commission is entitled to call for it. The Commission's staff
may not disclose any information acquired if it is covered by the obligation of

professional secrecy.
Part of the information has also been supplied to an international combine
established in Switzerland. However, the fact that information has been supplied
to a body governed by Swiss law does not mean that it can no longer be supplied to
the Commission. Nor are the Commission and its staff released from their obligation of professional secrecy simply because the information has been supplied to
the combine based in Switzerland.
Even if Swiss law could be interpreted to mean that the supply of information to
the Commission amounted to unlawful disclosure, this would still not warrant
delaying the performance of obligations
imposed by the Commission in order to
6
enforce the rules of competition.
4. Telos, supra note 3 at para. 21.
5. Zoja/CSC-ICI, Comm'n Dec. of 14 Dec. 1972, J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 299) 51 (1972).
6. Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor (CSV) Comm'n Dec. of 25 June 1976, O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 192) 27 (1976).
FALL 1984

844

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Last, under what circumstances might the addressee of a questionnaire
consider refusing to give any information until required to do so by way of a
formal decision? Such a refusal could be of particular interest if: the disclosure of certain information would run afoul of local law or might incriminate
others; 7 the scope of the inquiry lacks precision or if it is not clear whether
the information is really "necessary"; 8 or the addressee of the questionnaire
wants to reserve the right to file an appeal with the Court of Justice against
the request for information.
b. On-the-Spot Investigations
In a case of suspected infringement of Article 85 or 86, the Commission
may undertake all necessary investigations into companies and trade associations (including third parties). 9 This right of inspection by Commission
officials includes the right to: enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings; examine the books and other business records and to
take copies of same; and ask for oral explanations on the spot.
As in the case of requests for information, there is no sanction for refusing
to submit to an investigation unless and until the Commission adopts a
formal decision to that effect, which is subject to review by the Court of
Justice. However, unlike requests for information, the Commission is not
required to seek voluntary compliance first; it may immediately adopt a
decision compelling a company to submit to an investigation. 10
Until a few years ago companies in need of time to prepare for an
investigation had a clear interest in refusing voluntary compliance because it
would take the Commission many months to adopt a formal decision. Today
this time factor is no longer present because the Commissioner in charge of
competition matters has been delegated the power to make the decision on
behalf of all his colleagues. Hence, the delay involved has become a matter
of days rather than months." Since an on-the-spot investigation, especially
when carried out by surprise (often referred to as a "dawn raid"), constitutes a dramatic intrusion into privacy, it is only natural that the increasing

7. CSV, supra note 6.
8. E.g., RAI/UNITEL, Comm'n Dec. of 26 May 1978, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 157) 39

(1978) Fire Ins. (D), Comm'n Dec. of 9 Dec. 1981, O.J. EUa. COMM. (No. L 80) 36 (1982)
Castrol Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, Comm'n Dec. of 10 Jan. 1983, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L

114) 26 (1983).
9. Art. 14 of Reg. 17.
10. National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, 136/79,1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2033,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8682.
11. N.b., voluntary compliance by a company does not entitle it to submit to the investigation less "fully" than if it were acting under a formal order. FNICF,Comm'n Dec. of 27 Oct.
1982, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 319) 12 (1982).
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use by the Commission of this
power has given rise to difficult situations and
12
stirred up a lot of debate.
Commission's Memorandum. In an attempt to clarify the issues, the
Commission has issued an "explanatory memorandum," for attachment to
the inspectors' warrants, defining the powers of the officials and the rights of
the companies concerned. Unfortunately, this document is rather short, and
it does not go as far as the European Parliament wished, since it does not
contain the internal
rules of procedure and instructions to which the inspec13
tors are subject.
Nevertheless, the Commission's memorandum constitutes a step in the
right direction. It confirms the company's right to have its counsel present,
provided the inspection is not unduly delayed as a result. The explanatory
memorandum also establishes the company's right to obtain from the inspectors a signed inventory of the copies taken and a copy of the minutes, if
any, drawn up regarding oral explanations given on the spot. Furthermore,
the memorandum stresses the importance for the company of drawing the
inspectors' attention to any "favorable" factors. Admittedly, fairness requires that the inspectors should listen to whatever exculpating factors the
company subject to the investigation is able to adduce. However, this
presupposes that the company knows what it is all about. More often than
not this is not the case. A copy of the complaint, if any, is usually given much
later in the proceedings. Human nature being what it is, one may expect the
inspectors to be tempted to obtain a maximum of information from the
company with a minimum of disclosure from their side. As stated by an
experienced Commission inspector:
[I]t is not appropriate to expect the authorisations to provide a great deal of detail,
since the Commission officials, before beginning the investigation, give the business the opportunity to request explanations on the object of the investigation.
Such explanations should neither get bogged down in general discussion of the
applicability of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty to the particular case, nor

12. According to a Commission inspector:
Until 1979 the Commission has used its powers to order decisions only on rare occasions. In
general visits by appointment with the inspectors acting under authorisations proved an
adequate fact-finding method. Even when surprise was considered essential visits were
usually made under the non-compulsory procedure. Decisions were taken only where there
had been a refusal to co-operate on a voluntary basis.
This policy has undergone a marked change in the last few years. Since January 1, 1979,
investigations by decision have been made at 67 undertakings. In almost all cases there was
no prior warning.
J.M. Joshua, The Element of Surprise, in (1983) EUR. LAW. REV. at 4. Reply to Written
Question 677/79, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 310) 30 (1979).
13. Para. 53 of resolution on the Twelfth Report, Minutes of proceedings of the sitting of 24
Oct. 1983, at 34.
FALL 1984
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should they result in the Commission officials as it were laying their cardson the
table, in a way that could jeopardize the purpose of the investigation, before
business decides whether or not it is prepared for the investigation. (emphasis
supplied) 4

In other words, notwithstanding the Commission's effort to increase the
standards of fairness, it seems unavoidable that there will always remain a
"cops and robbers" aspect in every on-the-spot investigation.
Right of Entry v. Right to Search. It is unfortunate that the memorandum
of the Commission does not offer any practical guidance on how the investigation should actually be organized. Whereas in law the officials have a
right of entry, but not a right to search, this distinction may be hard to apply
in practice:
Nevertheless, the fact that the Commission does not have a right of search cannot

mean that the Commission officials must sit waiting in some conference room in
the business to see whether any of the documents requested are going to be
produced to them and, if so, which ones.
Rather, in order to attain the purpose of the investigation, it may be necessary for
the Commission officials, in accordance with their
5 right of entry, to see for
themselves whether certain records are available.

Therefore, depending on the circumstances, it may prove to be difficult to
prevent an inspector from rummaging through the files, though in principle
this ought to be resisted in order to avoid the inspection exceeding its precise
scope and degenerating into a fishing expedition. The executive in charge of
"welcoming" the Commission's inspection team will in most instances be
hard pressed to find a compromise solution between the inspectors' interest
in keeping "eye-contact" with the relevant filing cabinets (to avoid possible
removal or destruction of pertinent documents) and the company's interest
in limiting the intrusion to a minimum so that the exercise does not become
too "open-ended" and disruptive of the company's operations.
Duty to Assist. Furthermore it is to be noted that the company must do
more than passively undergo the inspection. In the Italian glass case, the
Commission made it clear that the company is under a positive duty to assist
the inspectors in their quest for certain documents:
The argument that Fabbrica Pisana has satisfactorily fulfilled its obligations by
generally putting all its files at the investigator's disposal must be rejected, since
the obligation on undertakings to supply all documents required by Commission
inspectors must be understood to mean not merely giving access to all files but
actually producing the specific documents required.

Nor can the argument that the Commission's inspectors did not examine the
business records of the administration department be accepted, as none of the
undertaking's representatives has told them that the documents requested were,
14. H.W. Kreis, EEC Commission Investigation Procedures in Competition Cases, 17 THE
INT'L LAW. (1983) at 36.
15. Id. at 44; Joshua, supra note 12 at 11.
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or might be, kept in that department and where there was otherwise
no reason to
16
suppose that documents of that nature might be found there.
The absence of a "right to search" on the part of inspectors, therefore, is
in any event compensated by a "duty to find" imposed on the company
Concerned.
OralExplanations. Another problem area on which the memorandum is
regretfully silent concerns the inspectors' right to ask for "oral explanations
on the spot." It is generally accepted that the inspectors have no right to
"interrogate" company officers or employees and that the questions they
are entitled to ask must, one way or another, be related to the books and
records that are being examined. However, it may be difficult in practice to
draw the line between a question properly arising from an examination of
the books and records and a question that lends itself better to a written
7
request for information.'
The question of "who" within the company should provide the oral
explanation is not dealt with in the Commission's memorandum. While legal
arguments can be found in favor of restricting the supply of oral explanations to persons who are duly authorized to represent the company, there
may be situations where the inspector will want to hear the information
"from the horse's mouth:"
It would thus appear eminently reasonable for the Commission officials to ask the
author of the document or anyone else who can provide an explanation. Indeed
refusal to let the inspectors see the persons who can most easily provide explanations could in an 18extreme case so obstruct the investigation as to amount to a
refusal to submit.
So again, this is an area where in the heat of the debate conflicting views may
well emerge.
Legal Privilege. One last point in connection with the Commission's
powers of discovery is the Commission's latest stand on the thorny issue of
legal privilege. The Commission, when interpreting the AM&S case in its
Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, made the following comments:
The inspectors may no longer have access to written communications between an
independent lawyer entitled to practice his profession in one of the Member States
and an undertaking for the purposes and in the interests of the latter's right of
defence, i.e., all written communications exchanged after the initiation of administrative enquiries and all earlier written communications which have a rela-

16. Fabbrica Pisana, Comm'n Dec. of 20 Dec. 1979, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 75) 30 (1980).
17. In Panasonic, supra note 10 the Court, in a dictum, has stated that the inspectors may ask
questions "arising from the books and business records which they examine". According to an
authoritative scholar this would mean that the Commission is entitled "to ask questions about
the conduct under investigation as opposed to simply the books or their contents, provided such
questions arise from the examination of such books" (C.S. KERSE, EEC" ANTITRUST PROCEDURE, 82 (1981). Admittedly, this is still a grey area.
18. Joshua, supra note 12 at 12.
FALL 1984
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tionship to the subject matter of those enquiries. The Commission is, however,
entitled to inspect all other pages. 19

This position has since evolved in that the Commission, while maintaining
the view that in-house counsel cannot qualify for any legal privilege, is
prepared to extend legal privilege to independent lawyers from outside the
Community by way of bilateral agreements on the basis of reciprocity:
In the interest of international equity and to avoid any deterioration of relations
between the Community and countries in which the same professional ethics are
respected, the Commission believes that it may be useful for the Community to
conclude bilateral international agreements with interested third countries, on the
basis of reciprocity, with the aim of extending legal privilege to the lawyers of
these countries. These agreements would be an addition to the existing Community rules in this domain and would therefore not require an amendment of
Regulation 17.20

c. Access to the File
Except for certain documents regarded by the Commission as "confidential" and hence not accessible (documents containing other companies'
business secrets; internal Commission documents such as notes, drafts or
other working papers; any information disclosed to the Commission subject
to an obligation of confidentiality), companies "involved in a procedure"
are now entitled to inspect the file on their case.2 t
A defendant's right of access to the file is the single most important
procedural innovation introduced by the Commission. Under the Court's
consistent case law, the Commission was hitherto only obliged to disclose all
documents on which it chose to rely. As a result a number of documents in
the Commission's file which might have been favorable to the defendant's
position remained inaccessible. It is remarkable that the Commission has on
its own initiative agreed to introduce greater transparency into its procedure
without having been ordered by the Court to do so: the prosecutor has
proven to be more generous than the judge.
Although the right of access to the files is a major breakthrough in the field
19. EEC Commission, Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, at point 33.
20. Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, point 78. For a comprehensive article on the
various considerations that have influenced the Commission in reaching the position it did, see
H.W. Kreis, The AM&S Judgment of the EuropeanCourt of Justiceand Its Consequences within
and outside the Community, Swiss REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW, at 3, n. 20,
(1984).
21. Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, point 34. As to the right of access to the file by
complainants, the Commission clarified their status as follows in its Thirteenth Report on
Competition Policy:
Although complainants do not automatically have a right to see the file during the course of
the examination of the complaint by the Commission, the Commission in practice ensures
that a complainant receives the replies and observations regarding the complaint, sometimes
in summary form, submitted by the undertaking(s) against which the complaint was lodged.
(Point 75)
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of due process, it is capable of further improvement. Indeed, there is still
soinething wrong with the timing. The Commission is only prepared to grant
access as of the moment that the Statement of Objections against the
defendant isissued. In a number of instances this may be too late. Since
years often elapse between the Commission's factfinding and the release of
the Statement of Objections in a particular case, it may become increasingly
difficult to verify or refute certain facts. In addition, the danger exists that in
the meantime more Commission officials have built their conviction on
elements which the inspector perhaps has misunderstood but which the
defendant has been unable to "nip in the bud."
It remains to be seen how broadly or narrowly the Commission will
construe the confidentiality exception. In this connection, for example, it is
interesting to note that the Commission in its Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy has agreed to release the purely factual reports drawn up by
the inspectors after an on-the-spot investigation but not their "final assessment reports. ,22 Perhaps, the Hearing Officer's scope of duties, discussed
later in this article, should be widened to include his intervention whenever
a dispute arises concerning the confidentiality exception.
2. Organizationof the Hearing

In view of the monolithic structure of the Commission, within which the
prosecutorial role tends to prevail over the adjudicatory function, it was
generally felt by defense counsel that hearings were not a very meaningful
exercise because they had to plead their client's case in front of a chairman
who had been responsible for bringing the action in the first place. In order
to remedy this situation the Commission has, within its antitrust administration, created a new post, that of "Hearing Officer."
The tasks entrusted to the Hearing Officer are to ensure that the hearing is
properly conducted, that the rights of defense are respected and that in the
preparation of the subsequent decision due account is taken of all the
relevant facts, "whether favourable or unfavourable to the parties concerned."'23 Specifically, the Hearing Officer has responsibility for: (1) organizing preparations for the hearing (fixing the date, duration and place as
well as the issues on which the presentations ought to focus); (2) conducting
the hearing (e.g., determining which new documents may be submitted,
whether witnesses may be heard, etc.); and (3) submitting, after the hearing, comments to the Director-General for competition on the continuation
of the procedure (e.g. need for additional information, withdrawal of certain objections or filing of an additional statement of objections).
22. Id. at point 74b.
23. Article 2 of the Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer, Thirteenth Report on
Competition Policy, at 272.
FALL 1984
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One should not expect miracles from this procedural innovation because
the Hearing Officer is supposed to work in close liaison with the Director
responsible for investigating the case. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
presence of the Hearing Officer is bound to create a better atmosphere
because it is not only important that justice be done but also that justice be
seen to be done. Furthermore, the involvement of the Hearing Officer
reduces the "shadow boxing" aspect of Commission hearings in that the
Hearing Officer will have a direct line of access to the Commission Member
in charge of competition matters. So, while the real judges, i.e. the fourteen
members of the Commission, remain "invisible," the parties are at least
pleading their case before a chairman who in turn has access to one of the
judges.
In the Commission's own words: "It is the Hearing Officer's duty to
ensure that the rights of the defence are respected, not only during the oral
hearing itself but also in the stages leading up to and following the
hearing.' '24 Hence, it is to be expected that interested parties will be able to
call on the Hearing Officer whenever disputes arise with the Commission's
staff in connection with a defendant's right
of access to the file and the
25
presentation of witnesses at the hearing.
3. Acceleration of Procedures

The Commission has become increasingly aware that the backlog of
pending cases and unprocessed notifications has reached unacceptable
proportions. It blames staff shortages, the necessary translation work and
the requirements of due process for slowing down the administrative
process. 26 The Commission proposes to remedy this state of affairs by the
more frequent adoption of interim measures; by issuing more block exemptions and by including so-called "opposition procedures" in such block
exemptions; by a more widespread use of comfort letters; and by encouraging more settlements and private enforcement.
a. Injunctive Relief
If need be, the Commission can act swiftly. Ten weeks after the receipt of
a complaint alleging the abuse of a dominant position, i.e., the charging of
predatory prices, the Commission adopted interim measures ordering the
defendant to return to price levels in effect before the threat of selective
price cutting was made. 27 This short time-frame is quite an achievement if
24. Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, Point 75.
25. In Cases 43/82 and 63/82, VBVB v. Commission (not yet reported) the Court ruled in
para. 18 of its judgment that under Art. 7 of Reg. 99/63 the Commission enjoys a reasonable
amount of discretion when it has to decide the question whether to hear or not to hear a given
person as a witness at the hearing.
26. Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, Point 71.
27. ESC/AKZO, Comm'n Dec. of 29 July 1983, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) 13 (1983).
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one takes into account the fact that the Commission has to send inspectors
down for an on-the-spot investigation, and that the interim decision has to
be translated into all six Community languages.
b. Block Exemption
It will be recalled that companies in doubt about possible EEC antitrust
objections to a given agreement for practice may request the Commission to
issue a decision ("negative clearance") whereby, based on the facts in its
possession, the Commission declares that there are no grounds under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
for action on its part against the
28
agreement or practice in question.
An agreement or practice which clearly restricts competition and thus
would be illegal under Article 85(1), may nevertheless escape prohibition
provided it receives the benefit of an exemption pursuant to Article 85(3).
This exemption is available when the Commission finds that the restrictive
effects of the agreement are offset by the advantages derived from it.
Applications for negative clearance are usually combined with a notification
of the practice to seek an exemption under Article 85(3), because only by
filing a notification does one secure immunity from fines-in respect to
activities subsequent to the
date of notification-in case the application for a
29
negative clearance fails.
Since the early days of EEC antitrust enforcement, the Commission has
preferred to regulate business under Article 85(3) instead of adopting a
more realistic interpretation of the required restrictive effect on competition
under Article 85(1) as first advocated by the Court in Socit Technique
Minigre.30 As a result of this policy the Commission's premises have been
literally flooded with notification papers. Indeed, if virtually everything is
deemed to be restrictive of competition under Article 85(1) and if a "rule of
reason" treatment is generally only applied by the Commission under
Article 85(3), business has little choice but to file individual notifications.
This flurry of notifications has been compounded by the fact that the
Commission has not refrained from imposing fines for infringements which
could only be established by developing or stretching the law further than in
its earlier interpretation, 31 and by the fact that in the recent Pioneercase the
28. Art. 2 of Reg. No. 17.
29. Art. 4(1) of Reg. No. 17.
30. Case 56/65 Socidtd Technique Miniire v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, (1966) E.C.R.

235.
31. For example, the Michelin case (Bandengroothandel Frieschebrug BV/NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin, Comm'n Dec. of 7 Oct. 1981, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 353) 33
(1981) on appeal Case 322/81, decided on 9 November 1983, not yet reported) where the
Commission condemned a yearly bonus system as an "abuse" even though its features did not
squarely fall within the concept of a "loyalty bonus" as defined in the Hoffmann-La Roche
case, case 85/76, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9T 8527.
FALL 1984

852

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Court gave the Commission "carte blanche" for its tougher fining policy.32
In order to stem the rising tide of notifications, the Commission has issued
block exemptions. 33 In principle, they do away with the need for filing
individual notifications and hence alleviate the burden on the Commission
staff.
Unfortunately, however, the recently enacted block exemptions on exclusive dealing and purchasing, for example, contain so many "ifs and buts"
that within months of their publication the Commission felt obliged to issue
a set of clarifying guidelines. 34 This goes to show that legal certainty is not
necessarily enhanced by the block exemptions issued by the Commission.
Hence, it is to be feared that the rhythm of individual notifications will rise
rather than fall, thereby increasing the workload of the Commission staff
and further burdening the Commission's process. To reduce some of this
burden, the Commission is currently revising the format of Form A/B, i.e.,
the form used for filing individual notifications. The revised form is expected
to require the disclosure of much more detailed information, notably on
market shares, than the form which is currently being used. As a result more
time and skill will be required to properly file a notification, thus adding to
the red tape involved in the exercise.
c. Opposition Procedure
An interesting development is the fact that the Commission has introduced a so-called "opposition procedure" in the proposed block exemptions
on patent licensing and on research and development agreements, and in the
proposed amendment of the block exemption on specialization agreements.
The opposition procedure provides that agreements, about which the Commission has been notified, are deemed acceptable to it if the Commission has
not objected to any of its provisions within a period of six months. This
procedure is designed to cover agreements which do not squarely fall within
the terms of the block exemption.
d. Comfort Letters
Another means devised by the Commission to dispose more expeditiously
of the backlog of pending notifications is the informal procedure called
"comfort letters". Under this administrative procedure, letters indicating
that a notified agreement is found unobjectionable by the Commission are
32. Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, Points 62-66.
33. Currently block exemptions exist for certain exclusive dealing O.J. EUR COMM. (No. L
173) 1 (1983) and purchasing O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983) agreements and for certain
specialization agreements O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 292) 23 (1972). It is anticipated that further
block exemptions will be issued in the near future covering certain patent licenses, research and
development agreements, and dealership agreements in the automobile sector.
34. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 101) 2 (1984).
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sent to the companies. "Comfort letters" are thus the informal equivalent of
a decision of negative clearance. Inits 1980 Perfume judgments, 35 the Court
of Justice upheld this procedure and stated that, while comfort letters are
not a bar to private suits before national courts, they can (but need not) be
taken into account by national courts in their assessment of the compatibility
of the agreement concerned with Article 85 (i.e., the same effect as a formal
decision of negative clearance).
In order to enhance the legal value of comfort letters, the Commission has
decided to publish a notice in the Official Journal stating the essential
contents of agreements for which it intends to issue comfort letters (i.e., the
procedure normally used when the Commission intends to issue a favorable
decision) so as to give third parties an opportunity to make known their
views. This new procedure was used for the first time in Europages.36 Cases
closed by a comfort letter will henceforth be listed in the Commission's
annual Report on Competition Policy.
While this new procedure arguably increases the legal value of comfort
letters, it also takes away an important advantage of the previously completely informal procedure-the absence of publicity. Now that even cases
disposed of by a comfort letter are the subject of a notice in the Official
Journal, it is increasingly likely that every agreement notified to the Commission will sooner or later be on public record (in the past, publicity was
restricted to the twenty or so cases per year disposed of by way of a formal
decision). The Commission is aware of this "side effect" and it seems that
notifying parties may request the Commission that, as in37the past, no notice
be published prior to the issuance of a comfort letter.
e. Settlements
The Commission also reduces the workload of its staff by encouraging
defendants to settle rather than try their cases. From Commissioner
Andriessen's reply to a question raised by a member of the European
Parliament, it is clear that the Commission is considering the possibility of
reducing the fine in cases "where enterprises actively assist the Commission
in establishing the facts against them, thereby saving time and expense for
all concerned... .
f. Private Enforcement
The Commission has no enforcement monopoly regarding the EEC antitrust rules. Any national court may likewise apply these rules. In order to
35. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 2327, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8712.
36. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 343) 5 (1982).
37. Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, point 72.
38. Answer to Written Question No. 2006/82, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 118) 21 (1983).
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reduce its workload, the Commission is actively encouraging private enforcement before national courts, including the possibility of claiming (single) damages:
In practice.., private individuals considering themselves the victim of conduct by
undertakings that is (sic) contrary to Article 85 or 86 may directly apply to a
national court for an injunction on the grounds of such breach. The machinery for
enforcing Community competition law is thereby to some extent decentralized,
the availability of relief more evenly distributed geographically and the place
where justice can be obtained brought closer to the individuals seeking it.... The
Commission is currently studying how to encourage actions before national courts
for enforcement of the prohibitions contained in Article 85 and 86. It is looking in
particular at what steps could be taken to facilitate damages actions. Improved
and more intense contacts between national courts and the Commission would
also help to tighten up enforcement of the prohibitions in these Articles.
Another definite step forward in the enforcement of Community competition law
by national courts would be to further develop the existing practice whereby the
court asks the Commission to give an opinion on issues arising from the case
before it, since39such clarifications could only be conducive to a good administration of justice.
It seems highly doubtful whether decentralized enforcement will actually
reduce the burden of the Commission. Quite to the contrary, companies
may file even more notifications to the Commission in order to seek protection against national enforcement. In addition, the Commission's propaganda for national enforcement is likely to turn the EEC into a paradise for
lawyers and into a nightmare for industry. Indeed, forum shopping-depending, inter alia, on local rules of discovery, the method of calculation of
damages and the possible reimbursement of lawyers' fees ,-and, sooner or
later, the application of national blocking statutes could all become part of
the trade.

4. Summary
It is, of course, too early to draw any meaningful conclusion about the
merit of the various procedural innovations which the Commission is in the
process of implementing. The important thing is that the Commission has
been willing to do something, demonstrating that the Commission is open to
suggestions and accepts that its procedures could be improved.
B.

THE COURT OF JUSTICE

It is anomalous that the EEC Commission, notwithstanding its prosecutorial role, has, over the years, proven to be more liberal than the Court on
issues of due process. In appeal proceedings before the Court, it would seem
that the rules of evidence followed by the Court are less geared to its own
39. Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, point 217-218.
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independent factfinding than to a review of the legality of the decision
adopted by the Commission.
1. Due Process

In almost all competition cases the Court dealt with on appeal arguments
of due process have been raised. Except for one case of relatively minor
significance, 40 the court has refused to quash the Commission's decision.
Usually, the Court's reasoning is to the effect that even in the absence of any
infringement of a principle of due process by the Commission, the outcome
of the case would not have been different. 4 1 The Court appears to be of the
opinion that the administrative nature of the proceedings before the Commission implies that lesser standards of care and fairness apply than in a
judicial proceeding.42 This restrictive view of due process by the Court is in
sharp contrast with the sometimes sweeping rulings of the same Court on
substantive issues where it has not hesitated to assume legislative powers as
in the ContinentalCan judgment, for instance 43 (whereas in the Quinineand
to read into the law a statute of
Dyestuffs judgments the same Court refused
44
defendants).
the
of
favor
in
limitations
2. Rules of Evidence

Although the Court's powers of review are very wide, encompassing both
the facts and the law, it has generally been reluctant to scrutinize discretionary decisions in the antitrust field. It is fair to say that from the outset the
Court has seen its role more as that of a constitutional or Supreme Court
dealing with legal issues than as a true Court of Appeals with plenary
jurisdiction. As early as its judgment in Consten and Grundig v. Commis-

sion, the Court drew attention to the fact that
40. Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1063.
41. See case law cited in Advocate General Warner's Opinion in case 30/78, Distillers

Company Limited v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, 2290, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)

8612.

42. In joined Cases 100-103/80, Pioneer v. Commission, not yet reported, the Court made
the following statement:
MDF maintains that the contested decision is unlawful by the mere fact that it was adopted
under a system in which the Commission combines the functions of prosecutor and judge,
which is contrary to Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights. (para. 6).

That argument is without relevance. As the Court held in its judgments of 29 October 1980
in Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78 (van Landewyck v. Commission (1980) E.C.R. 3125), the
Commission cannot be described as a "tribunal" within the meaning of Article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. (para. 7).
43. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v. Commission, (1973) E.C.R. 215.
44. Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 661. Case
48/9 ICI v. Commission, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619.
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[T]he exercise of the Commission's powers necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic matters. A judicial review of these evaluations must take
account of their nature by confining itself to an examination of the relevance of the
facts and of the legal consequences which the Commission deduces therefrom.
This review must in the first place be carried out in respect of the reasons given for
the decisions which must set out the facts and considerations on which the said
evaluations are based. 45

The Court's limited interest in the facts is confirmed by the little use it has
made thus far of its formal powers of investigation. Only in one competition
case has the Court ever appointed expert witnesses and their report, though
generally favorable to the defendant's thesis, was not even granted the
benefit of a discussion in the Court's reasoning which went in favor of the
Commission's point of view.
A reading of the Court's recent judgment in the Pioneer case, 46 indicates
that, even though competition cases can be said to be quasi-criminal proceedings, especially when high fines are inflicted, the standards imposed by
the Court relating to the kind of evidence that the Commission must adduce
to properly establish an infringement are not as high as those typically
applied in national criminal courts, where the accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven to be guilty, rather than the other way around: "in
dubio pro Commissione". 4 7 Consider the circumstantial evidence on which
the Court relied to confirm the Commission's findings against two of the
defendants, Pioneer Electronic (Europe) and C. Melchers & Co. The
Commission's evidence in support of its finding that Pioneer Electronic
(Europe) had participated in a concerted practice consisted mainly of the
fact that this company had organized a two-day meeting of its distributors on
its premises at which some of them had complained about parallel imports
and that it had forwarded information about such parallel imports to one of
its distributors. The Court did not accept Pioneer's contention that it was in
no position to have any control over the conduct of its independent distributors. Instead, the Court reasoned as follows:
Even if those activities do not necessarily confer on Pioneer a decisive influence on
the conduct of each of the distributors, that does not alter the fact that, on account
of its central position, it was obliged to display particular vigilance in order to
prevent concerted 48
efforts of that kind from giving rise to practices contrary to the
competition rules.

As to Melchers, the other defendant in Pioneer, the Commission relied on
statements made to Commission inspectors by Mr. Schreiber, the employee
of wholesaler Gruoner, who had placed the order which had allegedly been
45.
46.
47.
48.

Joined Cases 56-58/64, (1966) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, at 347.
Supra note 42.
V. Korah, The Pioneer Case in the European Court, EUR. REV. 339 (1983).
Para. 75.
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refused. 4 9 Even though Mr. Schreiber, under cross-examination by the
Court, had admitted under oath that he had lied to the Commission inspectors to cover up a calculation error he had made in the prices he had quoted,
the Court nevertheless decided to endorse the Commission's version of the
facts. To that effect the Court based its judgment on circumstantial evidence
which the Commission in its decision had clearly regarded as being less
important than Mr. Schreiber's statements. The Court disposed of the issue
by stating as follows:
The foregoing considerations suffice for a finding that the Commission has satisfactorily shown that Melchers refused to perform Gruoner's order on account of
the destination of the goods, without it being necessary to come to a decision on
the question of the credence to be given to the successive statements by Mr.
Schreiber or the question of Mr. Schreiber's conduct in transactions involving hi-fi
equipment of other makes, which,
according to the applicants, was similar to his
50
conduct in the present case.
Likewise disconcerting is a statement made in the same case by the
Advocate General who commented as follows on the credibility of Mr.
Schreiber as a witness:
Mr. Schreiber proved himself to be an unreliable witness and has changed his
explanation more than once. Nevertheless, I consider that on this point and on this
occasion the
Commission was entitled to conclude that Mr. Schreiber was telling
51
the truth.

One would have thought that once a witness has proven to be unreliable, it
would be extremely hazardous to pick and choose certain bits and pieces
from his testimony.
3. Summary
The Court of Justice has a heavy workload in a number of fields, several of
which could be deemed more important than competition cases. 52 It is
therefore not surprising that the Court has not felt a great desire to engage in
any substantial independent factfinding on its own in order to doublecheck
49. Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, Commission Decision of 14 December 1979, O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 60) 21 (1980):

(b) there was no obvious reason for Mr. Schreiber to misrepresent the truth in internal
company memos or notes;
(c) the statement by Mr. Schreiber, who is now Melchers' biggest customer, is more likely to
be true, as it was given by him while being against his interest, whereas Mr. von Bonin could
only find advantage in presenting after the event a different interpretation of the facts. (para.
69)
50. Id. at para. 60.
51. Page 42 of mimeographed version.
52. Notably some of the Court's "constitutional" functions, e.g., actions against Member
States for failure to comply with Treaty obligations, actions brought by Member States
regarding the legality of acts of Community institutions, referrals by national courts on matters
involving the interpretation of the Treaties.
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or improve upon the Commission's findings. Such attitude is also reflected in
a memorandum which the President of the Court presented to the Presidents of the Council of Ministers and of the Commission in the summer of
1978. Therein a proposal was made to set up a tribunal of first instance to
hear staff cases against whose decision an appeal could be filed with the
Court on questions of law only. The memorandum, indeed, mentions the
possibility that in the future some other categories of cases like competition
and antidumping cases, for instance, could likewise be the subject of a
similar arrangement. According to the Court's proposal:
Such a reform would have the advantage not only of bringing the Community
judicial system more into line with those of all Member States but also-and above
all-of making the Court to a large extent the judge of questions of law rather than
of fact, so concentrating its activities
on what is its true and main role within the
53
framework of the Community.
II. Antidumping

Although the aims pursued by the EEC antidumping policy are quite
different from-at times even in conflict with-the aims of its antitrust
policy, the procedures involved lend themselves to a comparison. At the
EEC Commission level, antidumping procedures are more informal,
quicker and more political than in the antitrust field and the Commission
enjoys greater discretion. At the Court of Justice, the admissibility hurdle
has recently been overcome. Hence, it is to be expected that a body of case
law will develop which, as time goes by, may set some constraints to the
discretionary powers of the Commission.
A.

THE COMMISSION

After a review of the procedural safeguards contained in the EEC Antidumping Regulation,54 the general characteristics of an EEC antidumping
proceeding will be discussed.
1. ProceduralSafeguards
The EEC Antidumping Regulation provides in essence for three proce-

dural safeguards: access to the file; the right to comment in writing and
orally; and the right to be informed of the essential facts and considerations.
a. The Discovery Procedure

The Commission has the right to seek and verify all information it deems
necessary and to carry out on-the-spot investigations to that effect, including
53. "EUROPE" Documents No. 1034 of December 20, 1978, at 4.
54. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, O.J.

referred to as "the Regulation."
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in third countries, provided that the companies concerned and the government in question have been officially notified and raise no objection.55 In the
event an interested party or a third country refuses to submit to the investigation, the Commission may base its preliminary or final findings "on the
basis of the facts available." 56 For this reason most parties find it to be in
their interest to actively cooperate with the Commission's investigation
team since otherwise the Commission is entitled to simply rely on the
allegations set forth in the complaint. This atmosphere of cooperation tends
to be in contrast with the general attitude of mutual distrust usually prevailing during an antitrust investigation.
In parallel to the Commission's powers of investigation, the parties concerned-i.e., the complainant and the importers and exporters involved, as
well as the diplomatic representatives of the exporting country-may inspect the Commission's file to the extent that it is relevant to the defense of
their interests and used by the Commission in the investigation. 57 Confidential documents and internal documents prepared by the EEC authorities or
its Member States are not accessible. Confidential information is defined as
information the disclosure of which "is likely to have a significantly adverse
effect upon the supplier or the source of such information." 58 However, if in
a particular situation a request for confidential treatment is not warranted
and the supplier is unwilling to authorize its disclosure in generalized or
summarized form, the EEC authorities may simply disregard the information in question. 59 In the author's experience there have been a few instances where the confidentiality protection afforded by the Commission
has been broader than necessary to protect business secrets. The result was
that the rights of the other parties to the investigation were unduly restricted. In this connection it is appropriate to refer to a Resolution of The
European Parliament recommending that "the confidentiality provisions of
Article 8 should be interpreted as narrowly as possible." 60 In this connection, the Commission is considering amending the Regulation so that information submitted will likewise be disregarded if the supplier is unwilling
to submit a non-confidential summary.
b. Written and Oral Submissions
When the Commission, after consulting the Advisory Committee (a
committee composed of representatives of the Member States), finds that an
antidumping complaint properly establishes a prima facie case of dumping,
55. Art. 7.2(a) & (b) of the Regulation.
56. Art. 7.7(b) of the Regulation.
57. Art. 7.4(a) of the Regulation.
58. Art. 8.3 of the Regulation.
59. Art. 8.4 of the Regulation.
60. EP Resolution on the Community's Anti-Dumping activities, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
11) 37 pt. 9 (1982).
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it publishes a notice of initiation of a proceeding in the Official Journal,
inviting all interested parties to file their written comments within
61 a fixed
time period, usually 30 days, and to apply for an oral hearing.
The written comments are ordinarily filed in the form of a reply to a
standard questionnaire which the Commission sends out to the parties
known to be involved. However, the parties are free to add whatever
information they find useful and will often prepare a detailed rebuttal of the
allegations made in the complaint. In practice the Commission staff has
proven to be flexible by frequently granting extensions of the deadline for
filing the written comments and by not objecting to the submission of further
information on an ongoing basis, as long as such actions are not interpreted
as an attempt to filibuster the proceedings.
As to the right of interested parties to be heard orally, the Regulation
provides for two kinds of hearings, an oral hearing, i.e., an exparte meeting
between a given party and the Commission staff, and a so-called confrontation meeting, i.e., a hearing attended by all sides and presided over by a
Commission official. 62 Oral hearings are more often applied for than confrontation meetings. At times confrontation meetings produce more animosity than practical results. In any event, parties cannot be forced to attend
such meetings.6 3 Incidentally, the Commission does not make any official
transcript of the hearings it organizes. Needless to say, the absence of an
official record may constitute a serious handicap if later in the proceedings
the parties would like to rely on certain statements made at the hearing.
c. Disclosure of Essential Facts and Considerations
Under the Regulation the exporters and importers concerned and, in the
case of subsidization, the representatives of the country of origin, are
entitled to be informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis
of which definitive measures are intended to be recommended. 64 This
fundamental right was introduced in 1979,65 as a result of the first judgment
of the Court of Justice in the antidumping field, the Japanese ballbearings
case. 6 6 In this landmark case, the Advocate General expressed his indignation about the lack of disclosure of essential information by the Commission
to the parties concerned:
61. Art. 7.1(a) of the Regulation.
62. Art. 7.5 & 6 of the Regulation.
63. Art. 7.6 of the Regulation.
64. Art. 7.4(b) of the Regulation.
65. Regulation (EEC) No. 1681/79, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 1 (1979) amending the
then applicable Antidumping Regulation 459/68, O.J. Spec. Ed. 1968 (1), at 80.
66. Cases 113/77, 118-121/77, NTN Toyo Bearing v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1185, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8574; for a comment on the
due process aspects of this case, see I. Van Bael, Ten Years of EEC Anti-Dumping Enforcement, J.W.T.L. 395 (1979).
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One of the major issues in these cases arises from the fact that the Commission did
not consider itself bound to disclose (its dumping) calculations, or anything about
them, to anyone; and did not do so ...
There is, of course, first and foremost, the glaring fact that, to this day, none of the

Applicants (nor this Court) knows what actual margins of dumping the Commission, as a result of its investigations preceding the adoption of Regulation No.
1778/77, found to have been practised by each of the Big Four nor whereabouts in
the Community it found those margins to have been practised. Much less do any of
the Applicants (or we) know how, precisely, those margins were calculated. Then
there is the fact, which I dealt with under my last subheading, that, not until the
Commission lodged its Rejoinders in Cases 119/77 and 120/77, was anyone told
that domestic prices had been "constructed" by the addition of a notional profit.
Nor did anyone know, until those Rejoinders were lodged, that the Commission
had up-dated the domestic prices, but not export prices, to January 1977.
The Commission reacted swiftly to this criticism. It caused the Council to
enact a special Regulation immediately, rather than waiting a few more
months until the entire Antidumping Regulation had to be amended to
bring it in line with the results of the Tokyo Round.
Under the new EEC Antidumping Regulation, the practicalities of the
right to request disclosure of essential information are laid down as
follows: 6 7 the request must be made in writing to the Commission and
specify the issues on which information is needed; in cases where a provisional duty has been applied, the request must be filed with the Commission not later than one month after publication of the imposition of the duty;
the Commission's reply may be given orally or in writing, "normally" no
later than 15 days prior to the submission by the Commission of any proposal
for definitive measures; comments made by the interested parties upon
receipt of the Commission's reply shall be taken into consideration if they
are received before the deadline set by the Commission (such deadline
should allow for a response time of at least ten days).
In addition to the improved transparency of EEC antidumping proceedings for the parties concerned, the Commission has for a few years made an
effort to make the proceedings somewhat more transparent for outsiders as
well. Today the Commission publishes considerably more information in
the Official Journal,compared to the sketchy, boiler plate type of reasoning
typically used in the early days of EEC antidumping enforcement.
2. General Characteristics
The speed of the procedure, the discretion enjoyed by the Commission in
shaping the remedy and the role of mediation played by the Commission in
the face of diverging interests are three main features of EEC antidumping
enforcement.

67. Art. 7.4(c) of the Regulation.
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a. Speed
Compared with antitrust cases, antidumping proceedings are fast. Under
the Regulation, proceedings should normally be concluded within one year
from their initiation. 68 The Commission has interpreted this requirement as
meaning one year from the formal opening of the proceeding even though
the date of receipt of the initial complaint would seem to be more in line with
the objectives of the system.
b. Discretion
The Commission enjoys a wide discretion under the Regulation. Not only
is it one and the same agency that deals with both the dumping and injury
requirement, but in addition it must apply a public interest test. Indeed,
if "the interests of the Community call for
definitive action is only warranted
' 69
Community intervention. "
Compared to the situation in the United States, the Commission has also
more room to maneuver when determining the existence of dumping. For
example, if for one reason or another the domestic price cannot be used to
establish normal value, the Commission invariably opts for a constructed
value calculation which offers greater flexibility to the enforcer than the
third country price approach which is preferred in the United States. By the
same token, when the Commission is doing a constructed value exercise, it is
not bound by any 8 percent profit or 10 percent general expenses rule.
Similarly, the Commission has considerable discretion in deciding
whether to move for a price revision undertaking or an antidumping duty.
Furthermore, the Commission enjoys great flexibility when it determines
the level of the price revision or of the duty. Indeed, under the Regulation
the amount of the duty need not be equal to the dumping margin, "it should
be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury." 70 In
addition it is important to realize that in the EEC duties are not fixed on a
per transaction basis as in the United States but prospectively. Again, this
leaves great freedom to the Commission regarding the practicalities involved in assessing the duty (e.g., duties can be set in reference to a floor
price; as a percentage ad valorem; on the basis of the weighted average of
different products; or as variable duties depending on the types of products
or the producers involved).
Needless to say, this great amount of discretion enjoyed by the Commission encourages all interested parties to cooperate with the Commission.
For example, when exporters are negotiating with the Commission over the
terms of a price revision undertaking after the Commission has already
68. Art. 7.9 of the Regulation.
69. Art. 12.1 of the Regulation.
70. Art. 13.3 of the Regulation.
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imposed a provisional antidumping duty, they are, in effect, negotiating
"with their backs against the wall." If the offer of a price revision undertaking is rejected and the provisional duty made final, the extra duty will
enhance the Community budget rather than the exporter's pocket.
c. Role of Mediation
Whereas in EEC antitrust proceedings the Commission's role is above all
perceived as prosecutorial, antidumping proceedings are characterized by
the role of mediator assumed by the Commission staff between pressures
from local industry and the wider "community interest." This may be due to
the fact that the Community's antidumping policy is enforced in a more
political environment than its antitrust policy. After all, under the EEC
Antidumping Regulation important powers are reserved to the Advisory
Committee, composed of representatives of the Member States, and to the
EEC Council of Ministers.
3. Summary

During the first ten years of EEC antidumping enforcement the Commission tended to pay little attention to issues of due process. Things have
changed as a result of the Court's judgment in the Japanese ballbearings
case, however. The Commission has since made a real effort to improve the
transparency of its procedure. The fact that the Commission is currently
proposing that the Council of Ministers adopt a further series of amendments to the applicable Regulation shows that further refinements are in the
offing. 71

B.

THE COURT OF JUSTICE

Until recently it was doubtful whether antidumping measures of the EEC

could be subject to judicial review. The EEC Antidumping Regulation is
silent on the matter. Hence, the question had to be examined under Article
173(2) of the EEC Treaty. For a person, other than a Member State or a
Community institution, to be entitled to challenge the legality of a Community Regulation under Article 173(2), he must be able to demonstrate that:
the act, though in the form of a regulation, instead of being of general
application is really ad hominem, i.e., affects particular persons because of
their own conduct; and the act is of direct and individual concern to him.

71. Amidst the proposed amendments, two would seem to be of particular interest: the
introduction of a "sunset provision," according to which final measures shall automatically
lapse after five years unless the need for their continued existence has been established, and the
introduction of a requirement that the investigation cover a period of not less than six months
immediately prior to the initiation of the proceeding.
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In the Japanese ballbearings case, the first antidumping measure which
gave rise to an appeal before the Court of Justice, the EEC Council and
Commission maintained that the regulation under attack constituted a
genuine generally applicable measure of a legislative nature. Antidumping
duties being an instrument of commercial policy, so the argument ran, the
regulation had to apply to all actual or potential importers whether or not
they were known or identifiable when the measures were adopted.
The Court, however, ruled in favor of the Japanese exporters. It noted the
essential relationship between the suspension of the final anti-dumping
duties and the price undertakings entered into by the four major producers:
[Alithough drafted in general terms, Article 1in fact concerns only the situation of
the major Japanese producers,... who are directly and individually concerned
by
72

reason of the undertakings which they have given to raise their prices.
Similarly, the Court found the collection of the provisional duty a matter of
direct and individual concern to certain importers:
Although the collection of the amounts secured by way of provisional antidumping duty isper se of direct concern to any importer who has imported the
products in question subject to such duty, the special feature of Article 3 which
sets it apart is that it does not concern all importers but only those who have
imported the products73 manufactured by the four major Japanese producers
named in that article.
Thus, in essence the Court held that the appeal was admissible because the
challenged Council Regulation was "a collective decision relating to named

addressees.

,74

In addition to winning on the admissibility issue, the Japanese exporters
also received a favorable ruling on the substance of the case. The Court
annulled the Council Regulation, holding that the Commission and Council
cannot have it both ways:
[I]t is unlawful for one and the same antidumping procedure to be terminated on
the one hand by the Commission's accepting an undertaking from the exporter or
exporters to revise their prices at the same time as, on the other, by the imposition
on the part of the Council, at the proposal of the Commission, of a definitive
anti-dumping duty.75

Notwithstanding the favorable outcome of the first appeal filed by exporters against an EEC antidumping measure, considerable doubts continued to
linger for a number of years about the likelihood of success of other appeal
proceedings in view of the Court's admissibility test focusing on the wording
of the antidumping relief, i.e., the crucial question being whether the
addressees of the measures are expressly named or not, rather than examin-

72.
73.
74.
75.

NTN Toyo Bearing, supra, note 66 at 1327, para. 13.
Id.at 1327, para 14.
Id.at 1205, para. 12.
Id.at 1207, para. 17.
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ing the nature of the procedure. In other words, it was feared that appeal
proceedings brought by exporters would only be held admissible insofar as
the applicants were subject to a specific duty and therefore individually
named in the operative part of the antidumping measure.
As a matter of fact, this fear proved to be well-founded since in 1982, in
Alusuisse, the first action brought by importers failed to clear the admissibility hurdle. The Court was of the opinion that "as regards independent
importers who, in contrast to exporters, are not expressly named in the
regulations", regulations imposing antidumping duties are true regulations
"because they apply to objectively determined situations and entail legal
76
effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in abstract."
The impracticability of the Court's formalistic admissibility test became
obvious when the Court in FEDIOL dealt for the first time with an appeal
brought by a complainant.7 7 Indeed, the complainant who triggered the
antidumping or antisubsidy investigation will never be individually named in
the operative part of the antidumping or antisubsidy measure, yet, his
individual interest can hardly be disputed. Faced with this dilemma, the
Court, rather than depriving the complainant of his right to apply for judicial
review of the Commission's action or inaction has preferred to change the
emphasis of its admissibility test. Instead of examining only the specific
wording of the relief, the Court this time concentrated on the nature of the
procedure. The Court noticed that the EEC Antidumping Regulation provides for a number of rights to which a complainant is entitled and drew the
conclusion
that, in the spirit of the principles which lie behind Articles 164 and 173 of the
Treaty, complainants have the right to avail themselves, with regard both to the
assessment of the facts and to the adoption of the protective measures provided for
by the regulation, of a review by the Court appropriate to the nature of the powers
reserved to the Community institutions on the subject.
It follows that complainants may not be refused the right to put before the Court
any matters which could facilitate a review as to whether the Commission has
observed the procedural guarantees granted to complainants by Regulation No.
3017/79 and whether or not it has committed manifest errors in its assessment of
the facts, has omitted to take into consideration any essential matters of such a
nature as to give rise to a belief in the existence of subsidization or has based the
76. Case 307/81 Alusuisse v. Council and Commission 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3463, 3472
at para. 9 [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8869. See also Allied

Corporation v. Commission, Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82, judgment of 21 Feb. 1984, not yet
reported, where the Court held that an importer, Demufert, had no standing because he "was
not directly concerned by the verifications concerning the existence of a dumping practice" (at
para. 15).
77. Case 191/82, FEDIOL v. Commission, of 4 Oct. 1983, not yet reported.
For a discussion of the significance of this case see J.-F. Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC
Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy DeterminationsAfter Fediol: The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 3 CML REV. (1984).
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reasons for its decision on considerations amounting to a misuse of powers. In that
respect, the Court is required to exercise its normal powers of review over a
discretion granted to a public authority, even though it has no jurisdiction to
intervene in the exercise of the discretion
reserved to the Community authorities
78
by the aforementioned regulation.

The Court's more realistic approach in FEDIOLon the admissibility issue

is, of course, a most welcome development. It was subsequently confirmed
in the Allied judgment in which the Court stated that exporters are allowed
to file an appeal even though they were not individually named in the relief
challenged, provided that they have been the subject of the "preparatory
investigation." 79 Hence, for the time being, only the situation of importers
remains unsatisfactory. They cannot file an appeal to the Court of Justice.
Their only redress is to challenge the collection of antidumping duties before
national courts on the ground that the Regulation imposing the duty is
illegal. It is to be hoped that the Court will eventually give them also the
benefit of judicial review under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty.
Although it is clear that the Court is likely to leave considerable discretion
to the Commission, rather than engaging in factfinding on its own, it is
nevertheless important that the principle of judicial review has been firmly
established. It will definitely have a restraining influence on the Commission
and thus pave the way to both a careful and reasonable exercise of the
Commission's discretionary powers.
III. Conclusion
Until a few years ago, the critical comments from legal and business
circles regarding the Community's procedures in the antitrust and antidumping field tended to be brushed aside as if the requests for more due
process were the expression of a decadent society. This attitude has
changed. The Community authorities have realized that their procedures
must become more transparent in order not to lose credibility. The Commission is in the process of improving the administrative proceedings in competition cases; and the Court of Justice, by allowing appeals to be filed in
antidumping cases, seems prepared to supervise the Commission's discretionary powers in the antidumping field.
Notwithstanding this improved climate, the fact remains that the proceedings before the Commission are administrative in nature. It is not an adversary type of judicial procedure since the Commission combines the functions
of prosecutor, judge and jury. Hence, it is to be expected that there will
always be something "Kafkaesque" about the Commission's procedures.
78. Para. 29-30.
79. Alusuisse supra note 76 at para. 12.
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After all, the real judge, the Commission as a collegiate body, is not seen to
participate in the proceedings: the judge is invisible and the defendant's fate
is sealed in an ex parte meeting. Furthermore, the Commission is not a
tribunal but a political agency. As a result its decisions80 are not made on
purely legal grounds but emerge in a political context.
A system of checks and balances is required when so much power is vested
in the EEC Commission as enforcer of antitrust and antidumping laws. The
"one shot" appeal before the Court of Justice is clearly insufficient to
guarantee an exhaustive analysis of the facts. Therefore, it is submitted that,
whatever further improvements the Commission is able to bring to its
administrative procedures, the need for a Court of first instance to try the
facts remains paramount. The Commission, the Court of Justice and the
European Parliament all support the creation of such a court. 8 1 Since the
establishment of a court of first instance would require the EEC Treaty to be
amended, it is suggested that the projected accession of Spain and Portugal
provides a good opportunity to that effect because the accession requires the
Treaty to be amended any way.
In any event, the fact that institutional changes are a lengthy process
should not discourage the drive to improve procedures. Indeed, the enforcement of economic policy decisions under the Community's antitrust and
antidumping policy can only be successful for the consumers if the underlying facts have been properly established. This in turn requires open and
exhaustive procedures allowing the defendants to put all their cards on the
table in the context of a fair debate.

80. A simple examination of a table of EEC competition cases shows that remarkably few
Italian and French companies have felt the rigors of EEC antitrust enforcement. Is it because
they are more law-abiding corporate citizens or is it because the Italian and French Governments support their industry more vigorously in Brussels? Furthermore, why is it that non-EEC
companies tend to attract the higher fines? By the same token a number of antidumping
proceedings have been terminated because of the conclusion of a voluntary restraint agreement. A recent example of this political solution can be found in the V.C.R. (Japan) case O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 86) 23 (1983).
81. See, supra note 52; Commission: Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, Point 16;
Commission: Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, Point 20; European Parliament: supra
note 13.
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